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Abstract: This article examines how colonial violence 
has been recast in light of Israel’s disengagement from Gaza 
during the summer 2005. By looking at infrastructural 
networks —the systems that distribute water, electricity, 
sewage, fuel etc—it explores how far from ending the 
occupation, disengagement provided a distinct spatial 
scale from which to experiment new methods of control 
and repression. In particular, it seeks to expose how these 
life support systems function as geopolitical sites of spatial 
control and as biopolitical tools to regulate and suppress life. 
Specially, it illustrates how the mobilization of discourses, 
strategies and doctrines, criminalize these critical systems 
turning them into ‘legitimate’ and ‘pre-emptive’ targets. 
Drawing on the destruction of Gaza’s only power plant and 
the subsequent sanctions on electricity and fuel, it argues 
that the destruction and manipulation of infrastructural 
networks has severe consequences, particularly in public 
health. In exploring these claims with respect to Gaza, the 
article draws attention to the ways in which infrastructures 
play a crucial role in regulating the elastic Gaza’s 
humanitarian collapse. The article closes introducing 
the concept of infrastructural violence as way to further 
explore this discussion.
Keywords: Infrastructural violence, Gaza 
disengagement, Israel, geopolitics, biopolitics, colonialism.
Desenchufe y Juegue: la Fabricación del Colapso 
en Gaza
Resumen: Este artículo analiza cómo han cambiado los 
roles en la violencia colonial tras la evacuación de Gaza en 
agosto de 2005. Enfocándose en las redes infraestructurales 
(es decir, los sistemas de distribución de agua, electricidad, 
cloacas, combustible, etc.) se asegura que, lejos de terminar 
con la ocupación, la evacuación implicó el surgimiento de 
una nueva escala espacial desde la cual experimentar nuevos 
métodos de control y represión. En particular, el artículo 
tiene por objetivo poner en evidencia que estos sistemas 
fundamentales para el funcionamiento de la vida son 
lugares geopolíticos para ejercer el control espacial, y son 
una herramienta biopolítica para regular y suprimir la vida. 
En particular se demuestra que los discursos, estrategias 
y doctrinas, criminalizan estos sistemas, convirtiéndolos 
en objetivos ‘legítimos’ y ‘preventivos’. Basándose en la 
destrucción de la única planta de energía eléctrica y en las 
consecuentes sanciones (limitaciones en el suministro de 
electricidad y combustible), se establece que la destrucción 
y la manipulación de redes de infraestructura tienen 
consecuencias graves, sobretodo para la salud pública. El 
análisis de estas cuestiones en el caso de Gaza demuestra 
la importancia del rol que juegan las infraestructuras en la 
regulación del elástico colapso humanitario en Gaza. El 
artículo culmina introduciendo el concepto de violencia 
infraestructural como elemento para profundizar el debate. 
Palabras clave: violencia infraestructural; evacuación de 
Gaza; Israel; geopolítica; biopolítica; colonialismo
Introduction
More than four decades of Israeli occupation have 
transformed the Gaza Strip into a place where life has 
been rendered dispensable. It is a sacrificed space: a 
showcase where de-colonizing moments and outbursts 
of resistance are crushed in spatial performances 
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that speak far beyond its borders. Nevertheless the 
actual contents of that showcase remain strangely 
unseen. Gaza is a space where territory and life is 
problematized as such; but the logistical and discur-
sive procedures through which Gaza is made into 
target and a site of regulated humanitarian collapse 
remain hidden. How is this accomplished? And what 
explains its effectiveness? The aftermath of the Israeli 
redeployment within Gaza during the summer 2005 
raises fundamental questions about how this event 
abstracted Gaza by way of distance. Concurrently, it 
demonstrates how reassembling the regime of control 
and containment contributed to legitimize the crimi-
nalization of everyday life and its sustaining fabric. As 
French philosopher Henri Lefebvre aphorises, “there is 
a politics of space because space is political” (Lefebvre 
1976: p.33). Studying the exercise of power through 
actual colonial infrastructure and bureaucracies thus 
aims at revealing the enactment of a particularly 
violent politics of space. 
In what follows I work with these ideas to expose 
the ways in which, in the wake of Gaza’s unilateral 
disengagement plan, the Israeli government reinforces 
the manipulation and destruction of infrastructural 
networks as a political tool to create and regulate a 
humanitarian crisis1. In doing this, the paper is an 
attempt to develop a preliminary and critical geopoli-
tics of the infrastructure-violence nexus in the Gaza 
Strip. The paper begins by describing the spatial reas-
semblage of Gaza following the Israeli evacuation. 
I argue that this new assemblage represents a new 
colonial reality whereby infrastructural networks gain 
force as geopolitical sites to assert spatial control and 
as biopolitical tools to regulate and suppress life. I 
then look at the mobilization of discourses, strategies 
1. The material collected for this paper and the actual 
writing of it was previous to the Israeli war of aggression against 
Gaza during the winter 2008-2009. Although these events have 
not being incorporated into this article, the bloody attack and 
its unfolding consequences are of the outmost importance for 
this study in so far as they are proof of the violent turn on Israel’s 
occupation that this research locates in Gaza after the so called 
disengagement. This is particularly so in terms of the misuse 
and abuse of infrastructure networks for geo-and-bio political 
purposes as they are exposed here. 
and doctrines that criminalize these public utilities 
as ‘terrorist infrastructure’, turning these essential 
assets into political, ‘legal’, and military targets. The 
destruction of Gaza’s power plant and the subsequent 
sanctions on fuel supplies are used as an example to 
expose the wider political and public health implica-
tions of targeting these life-support systems. Finally I 
reflect upon the idea of infrastructural violence and its 
role in the current humanitarian catastrophe. 
A Mock Farewell Party
In the early morning of September 12 2005, after 
shutting down the gate of the Kissufim crossing, Gaza 
commander Brig Gen Aviv Kochavi, the last soldier 
to leave the Strip, declared: “The mission has been 
completed … The responsibility for whatever takes 
place inside falls upon the [Palestinian] Authority” 
(Shany 2006: p.3). These words and an executive 
decree proclaiming the end of military rule concluded 
the unilateral disengagement plan in Israel’s “offi-
cialdom”, seemingly putting an end to 38 years of 
occupation of the Gaza Strip. The previous month left 
memorable images of a disengagement drama broad-
casted around the world. Unarmed Israeli security 
forces pulled out defiant and distressed settlers from 
houses and synagogues. Meanwhile bulldozers reduced 
the suburban colonial landscape of Israeli settlements, 
military infrastructure, agricultural fields, and indus-
trial states to rubble. In less than a month, more than 
eight thousand settlers were removed and the most 
visible infrastructure of the occupation completely 
dismantled. The world celebrated the disengagement 
as a move towards peace.
Yet Gaza remained subject to a suffocating 
closure (see Figure 1). Its territory fragmented. And 
the spectre of Israel intervention loomed ever-present. 
Furthermore, Gaza’s economy had been de-developed 
over four decades of Israeli occupation and exposed, 
together with the West Bank, to a campaign of 
outright urbicide after the beginning of the second 
Intifada in 2001 (Roy 2004; Graham 2002). This 
open-ended military operation violently rewrote 
Gaza’s geography and particularly the northern loca-
tions of Beith Hanoun, Beit Lahia, and Jabalia and 
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the southern areas of Khan Yunis and Rafah. It was 
a systematic effort to ‘shrink by bomb and bulldozer’ 
these living spaces so as to fit the narrow strip within 
the expansion of the mid-nineties wall, the buffer zone 
and the spatial designs of Israel’s colonial project. The 
human and material costs of this campaign, which 
were amplified by frequent closures, left Gaza in a 
permanent state of crisis. Yet the praised ‘peace’ initia-
tive from the early nineties, the Oslo accords, was in 
fact the main responsible in regularizing a framework 
that enforced a state of permanent dependency as 
well as spatialities of fragmentation and segregation 
(Parker 1996). Disengagement was in fact a variation 
of an Oslo strategy that to a very real extent allowed 
Israeli planners to apply doctrine and concepts that 
had been drawn long before –namely Allon, Dayan, 
Drobless and Sharon Plans (Gregory 2004). These 
plans, albeit in different ways, sketched out arrange-
ments for the regulation of space where the Israeli 
government retained control over Palestinian move-
ment, economy, and natural resources. The result was a 
system of Palestinian archipelagos—islands held apart 
from each other and the wider world—isolated by an 
elaborate system of infrastructural networks, check-
points, barriers, and outright closures. The supporting 
infrastructure of ordinary life became both target and 
weapon, an instrumental asset in Gaza’s isolation, 
destruction, de-development, and de-humanizing 
experience.
As such, the disengagement was one of Ariel 
Sharon’s –Israel’s former Prime Minister—final 
legacies to Zionism, a staged spectacle for massive 
consumption both at home and abroad. In Guy 
Debord’s terms it could be described as an event 
intended for paralyzing history and memory and for 
suppressing the historical and present time of Israel’s 
colonial enterprise; a disengagement from time to 
create a false consciousness of a fake farewell party 
(see Debord 1994). Dov Weissglas, the architect and 
leading advocate and negotiator behind the plan, 
considered disengagement as a device to freeze time 
in a way that postponed indefinitely any option for 
peace. In his own words: “[Disengagement] supplies 
the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there 
will not be a political process with the Palestinians” 
(Shavit 2004). The unilateral move had nevertheless 
higher stakes. Sharon’s plan aimed at getting rid of 
Gaza’s economic and demographic burden while 
revisiting its legal status as an occupied territory 
(Cook 2006). The Israeli Government could thus 
free its hands from any binding responsibility, as an 
occupier state, towards Gaza’s territory and its inhab-
itants. Spectacle, as recreation of a powerful repertoire 
of images depicting the dismantlement of the colo-
nial landscape and the evacuation of a civilian and 
military army, thus preceded and supersede any sense 
about the real meaning of disengagement. The evacu-
ation certainly took place, but neither the occupation 
nor military law ended as Sharon try to convey from 
the podium of the General Assembly a month after 
the evacuation (Israel Prime Minister Office 2005). 
The transformation of Gaza into an open-air prison 
was but a partial geographical solution to a stagnant 
political-diplomatic and economic situation. Israel 
disengaged with time in that it tried to erase the colo-
nial past, yet it engaged with space in a distinct scale 
to uphold the colonial present. 
Colonial Rescaling and ‘Remote Control’ 
Occupation
It is in this context that the disengagement turned 
the spotlight to a delusional reality of a liberated Gaza 
ready to prove itself to the world. The unilateral decision 
to evacuate the illegal settlers from Gaza was portrayed 
as the definitive step towards ending the occupation, 
a model that could inspire the future redeployment 
of Israel from the West Bank, and even an economic 
opportunity to transform Gaza into the Dubai of the 
Mediterranean. Yet the reality turned out to be very 
different. A land-based military presence was substi-
tuted by a ‘remote control’ occupation in which aerial 
bombardment, siege, sanctions, and infrastructural 
networks played an increasing role, albeit not a new 
one, in the control and management of territory and 
everyday life. The very text of the disengagement plan 
explicitly provided much of the ‘new’ colonial order 
(Knesset 2004). The State of Israel unilaterally decided 
to keep the right to guard and monitor the external 
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perimeter of Gaza while regulating all incoming and 
outgoing flows of goods and people. The air space, the 
sea and the electromagnetic field remained under their 
sole security and control. Additionally, and according 
to the plan, the Government allowed the continuation 
of the supply of water, electricity, gas and petrol ‘as a 
rule’. Essential services were thus to be provided by 
the very infrastructure that ties Gaza to Israel and that 
was left untouched after the evacuation. In addition, 
Israel preserved “its inherent right of self defence, both 
preventive and reactive, including where necessary the 
use of force, in respect of threats emanating from the 
Gaza Strip” (2004: p2). Thus the plan exposed what 
was little more than garrison’s realignment behind 
the ‘penitentiary’ wall awaiting a sign to punish the 
inmates of the ‘iberated’ prison. 
Twelve days after the evacuation the Israeli Air 
Forces carried out several attacks in the strip killing 
two persons, injuring 24 and damaging 17 houses 
and a school (Al-Haq 2006). The raids were an asser-
tion of power and a reminder that the occupation had 
not ended. Airpower not only provided surveillance 
capacity over the allegedly unoccupied territory, but it 
was also turned into a recurrent instrument of intimi-
dation and death. Sonic booms – shocks caused by 
jets breaking the sound barrier—, which reportedly 
cause anxiety, panic and fear in children as well as 
miscarriages in women, became a daily and nightly 
routine after disengagement (El-Sarraj 2005). These 
practices exposed the new spatial scale of colonial 
engagement and, as Darryl Li argues, confirmed 
airpower as the routine method to manage the occu-
pation (Li 2006). Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, first air 
officer to hold the head of Israeli military intelligence, 
defined the new rules of engagement in 2004: “Our 
vision of air control zeroes in on the notion of control. 
We’re looking at how you control a city or a territory 
from the air when it’s no longer legitimate to hold or 
occupy that territory on the ground.” (Li 2006: p.48)
In addition to airpower, infrastructural networks 
acquired a critical role in post-evacuated Gaza in two 
respects: firstly, in reassembling the regime of spatial 
control and secondly, in manufacturing a regulated 
humanitarian collapse. These seemingly banal and 
ubiquitous systems have been historically strategic 
assets binding the occupied Palestinian territories –
West Bank and Gaza—to Israel, as well as the essential 
life arteries that sustain and facilitate the expansion of 
the settlement enterprise. These networks epitomize 
an unbreakable colonial umbilical cord that facilitates 
the maintenance and exercise of power and the instru-
mentalization over both population and territory. 
Stephen Graham argues how infrastructures, because 
of the ways in which they connect, bind, and enable life 
and movement, become essential targets and poten-
tial instruments of war (Graham 2005). Describing 
the ‘geometry of the occupation’ in Palestine, Eyal 
Weizman explains the way “[Israeli] architecture and 
planning were used as the continuation of war by 
other means. Just like the tank, the gun, and the bull-
dozer, building matter and infrastructure were used 
to achieve tactical and strategic aims. It was an urban 
warfare in which urbanity provided not only the 
theatre of war but its very weapons and ammunition” 
(2004: p.172). Weizman also notes how Israel main-
tains its power over and underneath the Palestinian 
territory by exercising control over the water aquifers 
as well as through the airways and electromagnetic 
fields (2004: p.190). Infrastructure networks thus 
become effectively essential geopolitical artefacts that 
expand Israel’s power as tentacles over and underneath 
the territory. 
Life Support Systems as Biopolitical Tool
The mediating geography of tubes, pipes, wires 
and corridors that pierces Gaza is thus an essential 
mechanism to control and regulate any incoming or 
outgoing flow to the strip. Infrastructure networks 
are conceived as an umbilical cord that ties colo-
nized bodies and territory to the colonizer while at 
the same time enforce a severe and enduring depend-
ency. An anxious uncertainty and unpredictability is 
the functioning principle of these technical systems. 
Palestinians are in this way systematically subjected to 
the will of the State of Israel which designs, manages 
and interferes at will with the proper functioning of 
these life support arteries. Given its capacity to manage 
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and control public utilities, the State of Israel is able 
to create the possibilities for life, but also to induce 
failure and death. This environment where seemingly 
insignificant technical systems periodically intrude 
upon the lives of the Palestinians hardly makes it to 
the attention of the mainstream media or academia. 
And when it does, it is difficult to convey the extent to 
which these modes of bio-power reach to the utmost 
details of everyday life. Infrastructural networks bring 
the politics of colonial occupation to the very spaces 
of daily life practice, invading the most intimate and 
private ones: the living rooms, kitchens and bath-
rooms of the Palestinian homes (see Barakat 1998 
and Agre 2001). As Graham reminds us, the intercon-
nected nature of these infrastructural ‘scapes’ and the 
fact that they co-evolve in their interrelationships with 
territorial development is what makes them seam-
lessly woven into the fabric of social and economic 
life (Graham 2005). Infrastructure networks are thus 
the life support systems of modern societies, source of 
their vitality and yet source of its own fragility and 
manipulation.
Since the 1967 occupation Israel pursued a double 
policy regarding life support systems. On the one hand 
it took over the existing infrastructure networks in 
the West Bank and Gaza, and on the other, that very 
infrastructure was connected to the Israeli networks 
creating a total dependency relation that remains in 
place to this day. In 1994, Oslo was essential in insti-
tutionalizing and normalizing this control apparatus 
that included both the very material (and immate-
rial) infrastructure of these networks as well as the 
related bureaucracies in place to regulate them. Israel 
was thus able to retain absolute power over natural 
resources, and flows of people, goods, money and 
essential services. In addition to the control and regu-
lation of existing networks, the development of large 
and small infrastructural projects in the Palestinian 
areas remains to a large extend subjected to the 
approval by the State of Israel. This is primarily done 
through a dedicated infrastructural branch under the 
so-called civil administration; the sovereign authority 
in the territories that works as a bureaucratized appa-
ratus that intrudes and actively intervenes in the daily 
life of the population (Tamari 1983). As it appears on 
the website of the Israel Defence Forces: “This branch 
organizes the operations of civil administration bodies 
in the region of Judea and Samaria [West Bank] 
and the Gaza penitentiary in all issues pertaining to 
water, plumbing, electricity, communication, interna-
tional funding projects, and communication for the 
settlements in Judea and Samaria” (emphasis added) 
(Israeli Defence Forces 2010). To this very day, the 
civil administration, mainly through the ‘joint coop-
eration committees’ created as a result of Oslo, engage 
Palestinians and international donors and aid agencies 
in infrastructure project negotiations that are either 
endlessly delayed, seriously decapitated, or rejected 
for the most part (Selby 2003). Also interesting was 
the way Oslo turned up to be exquisitely vague when 
defining the transfer of infrastructure competences to 
the Palestinian Authority, yet extremely precise in the 
very amounts and quantities to be provided through 
these life support systems. This is particularly the case 
for water, electricity, fuel and telecommunications as 
reflected in the interim agreement (IA 1995). Israeli 
scientists and experts, military staff and humanitarian 
experts are left to provide estimations deemed neces-
sary to fit the population growth, thus fixing and 
regulating the ‘suitable’ flow of essential services to be 
distributed.
The modalities of infrastructural violence brought 
by the second intifada and particularly by the evacu-
ation and subsequent outright closure and separation 
of the Gaza strip, were nevertheless different in nature 
from previous practices of infrastructural rule in so 
far as they reconstituted and invested earlier colonial 
modes of biopower into more lethal forms2. Neve 
2. To be clear, the notion of biopower devised by Foucault 
to explain the forming violence(s) of “modernity” in the liberal 
European state, one concerned with maximizing the health and 
wealth of the population (Foucault 1978), cannot be applied 
in the colonial context of Palestine without qualification. 
Here, Zionist settler colonialism gave way to a biopolitics (in 
combination with other forms of power) that racially objectify 
and geographically segregate the indigenous population. This 
was done with the aim to “establish a delicate balance in which 
the health of the population and especially the physical terrain 
on which it exist are minimized without effecting a total 
elimination” (Hanafi 2009: p.113). 
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Gordon has shown that “it is the shifting emphasis 
on one or the other modes of power, rather than 
the introduction of new forms of control, that helps 
explain the extensive transformation in Israel’s occu-
pation [since 1967]” (Gordon 2008: p.11). This, 
according to Gordon, helps to distinguish different, 
yet organically linked, periods of the occupation that 
respond to how different forms of control operate, 
interact with each other and how they produce certain 
impacts (2008). The modes in which biopower was 
infused through infrastructure networks to exercise 
violence over bodies and territory in post-evacuated 
Gaza, effectively exposed the most ugly face of the 
radical relationality between colonizer and colo-
nized. The geopolitics of infrastructure networks was 
inscribed by a biopolitics that intrudes and shapes 
the very mode of being and dying. Two phenomena 
are at work in the spatialization of violence, namely a 
techno-politics of space and a biopolitical instrumen-
talization of the body. Life is coupled in a cyborg-like 
binary –of human and machine—to the material 
appendix of networked infrastructure. The very infra-
structure that serves as a tool of control and regulation 
is turned into a life threatening system; ‘addicted’ 
bodies dependent on the supply of the basic services 
machine to the extreme of death (Gandy 2005). The 
logics of infrastructural violence after disengagement 
are not as much concerned with inscribing bodies 
within a disciplinary apparatus as with placing bodies 
in the threshold of life and death. This manipulation 
of infrastructure forces a permanent experience of 
‘being in pain’, a way to confer the status of ‘living 
dead’ to the object populations. This is what Mbembe 
describes as necropolitics, a contemporary form of 
subjugation of life to the power of death that drives 
the generalized instrumentalization of human exist-
ence and the material destruction of human bodies 
and populations (Mbembe 2003). However as 
Bhungalia notes, “perhaps, whereas Foucault produces 
a totalizing narrative about life, Mbembe constructs 
a totalizing discourse of death”. Moreover she argues 
that “while Gaza certainly resembles Mbembe’s ‘death 
world’, the Israeli state has expressed, as well, vested 
interest in regulating Palestinian life at a biological 
minimum.” (Bhungalia 2009: p.355). Looking at 
infrastructure networks nevertheless reveals that prac-
tices of infrastructural violence show different modes 
of biopower in specific time-and-space configurations 
and thus, have the potential to enforce one or both 
logics –optimization of life or death—simultaneously 
or in different historical moments as in the case of 
Gaza. 
Fabricating ‘Terror Infrastructure’
Underlying the use of life support systems, as 
both geopolitical sites and biopolitical tools, lies the 
mobilization of a repertoire of ideas, forms, images 
and imaginings that fabricate Gaza as an alien space 
devoid of humanity; a ‘terrorist space’ where the urban 
and rural habitat and its support systems are reduced 
to ‘pre-emptive’ sites of punishment or destruction 
(Finoki 2009). These discursive mechanics are a prom-
inent feature of Israel’s particular and lengthy ‘war 
on terror’ against the Palestinians. Gregory (2003: 
p.307), building on Edward Said, highlights how 
imaginative geographies fold distance into difference 
through a series of spatialisations, spatial demarcations 
that define and oppose “one’s familiar space which is 
‘ours’ and an unfamiliar space beyond ‘ours’ which 
is theirs.”. Moreover, Gregory (2004b: p.185) shows 
how imaginative geographies are “in some substantial 
sense performative”, and thus potentially perform-
ances of space given that “it produces the effect that it 
names”. The criminalization of Gaza works very much 
in this way. A systematic categorization and represen-
tation of Gaza as a ‘hostile territory’ allows Israel to 
repress political and violent resistance –to colonial 
occupation—through symbolic and actual spatial 
enactments of violence. 
The categorization of Gaza as ‘enemy entity’ is a 
clear-cut example of the way the machinery of imag-
inative geographies is put into motion and how it is 
used to justify the cuts and disruptions of infrastruc-
ture networks as a measure of collective punishment. 
Following frequent barrages of Palestinian homemade 
rockets, the 19 September 2007, three months after 
Hamas took control over the Gaza strip in what jour-
nalist David Rose described as a counter-coup against 
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Fatah (Rose 2008), Israel’s security cabinet unani-
mously decided that Gaza was a ‘hostile territory’. In 
light of this decision the cabinet decided to adopt a 
series of recommendations presented earlier by the 
security establishment that included: “… continuation 
of military and counter-terrorist operations against 
the terrorist organizations. Additional sanctions will 
be placed on the Hamas regime in order to restrict the 
passage of various goods to the Gaza Strip and reduce 
the supply of fuel and electricity. Restrictions will also 
be placed on the movement of people to and from the 
Gaza Strip. The sanctions will be enacted following a 
legal examination, while taking into account both the 
humanitarian aspects relevant to the Gaza Strip and 
the intention to avoid a humanitarian crisis.” (Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007: p.1).
Infrastructural networks are in this way trans-
formed into ‘terrorist infrastructure’, an ‘evil apparatus’ 
that sustains ‘insurgent activity’, a threat that creates 
local and regional instability and that therefore needs 
to be aimed at (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2008). News headlines, institutional declarations, and 
political speeches, uniformly and incessantly quote 
and call for the need to ‘dismantle’, ‘target’, ‘disrupt’, 
‘eliminate’ or ‘operate against’ Gaza’s supporting 
‘terrorist infrastructure’. The same life dependent 
systems that distribute electricity, fuel, water, food 
or sewage become incorporated into a narrative and 
a policy that translates into indiscriminate punish-
ment. Law protects civilians from direct attack but, 
as Thomas W. Smith argues, discrimination turns 
to fiction “when extended to electrical grids, water 
supplies and other infrastructure that are the sinews 
of everyday life” (Smith 2002: p.361). The sanctions 
and disruptions are enacted under a political-juridical 
register that justifies what is legally unjustifiable –under 
international law— while appealing to an exceptional 
and-or emergency situation. For the State of Israel the 
logic is one of lawfare, what former American General 
and military judge Charles Dunlap calls “the use of 
law as a weapon of war”. Eyal Weizman expands this 
notion to explain the elastic nature of the law and 
the power of military action in the case of Gaza. He 
argues how Gaza is turned into an experiment to test 
new warfare techniques and where “certain limits are 
tested and explored: the limits of the legal, the limits 
of the ethical, the limits of the tolerable, the limits 
of what can be done to people in the name of ‘war 
on terror’.” (Weizman 2009: p.5). The fabrication of 
the ‘hostile territory’ formula thus not only rewrites 
geography and creates a dedicated legal terminology; 
it becomes, paradoxically, the means to legitimize the 
exercise of repression. Yet indiscriminate violence, as 
the Security Cabinet agreed, is one with ‘humani-
tarian concerns’. 
Infrastructural Oxygen: “Cut it all off!”
The fabrication of imaginative geographies has been 
an essential mechanism to single out infrastructure 
networks as assets that need to be either disrupted 
or destroyed, as well as a powerful tool to mobilize 
both political and public consent. A post-evacuated 
Gaza emptied of settlers and fully isolated, provided 
the ideal scenario to exercise collective punishment 
through the interconnected network of infrastructures 
that previously served both Israelis and Palestinians. 
Jonathan Cook notes how Ariel Sharon’s team first 
proposed cutting off electricity to the strip after disen-
gagement (Cook 2008). The measure, as Cook argues, 
was rejected for both being suspected of violating 
international law and as a move that could undermine 
Fatah’s chance of wining the January 2006 elections 
(Cook 2008b). Hamas did win the elections, and in 
the early morning hours of the 28 June 2006, less than 
a year after the disengagement, the Israeli Air Forces 
fired eight missiles that destroyed the six generators 
of the only Power Plant in Gaza. This decision was 
justified as an attempt to release an Israeli soldier 
captured three days earlier over the border. B’tselem, 
the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in 
the Occupied Territories, however, reported that the 
attack constituted a war crime and that it “derive 
directly from one cold, calculated decision, made by 
Israel’s prime minister, defense minister, and the IDF 
chief of staff” (B’tselem 2006: p.2). In addition the 
report expressed its reservations about the leitmotiv 
of the attack, arguing that it had nothing to do with 
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the attempts to release the soldier or achieve military 
needs.
Prior to the bombing of the electricity plant, Gaza 
used about 220 megawatts of power: approximately 
100 megawatts produced by the Palestinian Electric 
Corporation (PEC), and the remaining 110 megawatts 
provided by the Israeli Electric Corporation Company 
(IEC). Yet, as B’tselem highlights, “in addition to the 
direct dependence on electricity from Israel, Gaza’s 
electricity sector is indirectly dependent on Israel: 
all the fuel and natural gas needed to operate the 
turbines of the Gaza power plant come from Israel” 
(B’tselem 2006: p.5) The destruction of the power 
plant added to, and enhanced, what already was a 
chronic dependency on a legacy of colonial infrastruc-
ture used to manipulate and regulate the life of the 
colonized. Yet this particular attack was important 
in so far as it manifested the turn from a “regula-
tory” to an “asphyxiatory” application of power. The 
destruction of the power plant was but the kickoff 
for military operation codenamed Summer Rains. 
Rains did indeed fall over the power plant but also 
drenched Gaza’s infrastructural fabric, particularly 
electricity networks. The ground military operation 
that followed the destruction of Gaza’s power plant 
targeted the power distribution network, as well 
as water mains, sewage systems, roads, bridges, or 
telecommunication systems. The United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) estimated the damage caused to Palestinian 
infrastructure by IDF incursions, shelling and rocket 
attacks to be USD 15.5.million; not including the 
USD 15 million in damage caused by the IAF air 
strike on the Gaza power plant (OCHA 2006).
Bombing the power plant left Gaza entirely 
dependent on Israel’s production of electricity and fuel 
supplies and marked the beginning of an open policy 
of infrastructural violence. Haim Ramon, Minister of 
Justice at the time and former Vice Premier, elabo-
rated on the issue of infrastructure and collective 
punishment following the decision to declare Gaza 
strip a ‘hostile territory’. Ramon referred to the term 
‘infrastructural oxygen’ as a new doctrine advocating 
the cutting off electricity, fuel and water supply to 
Gaza (Levy 2007). Ramon already proposed this 
doctrine a year earlier by suggesting an air warfare 
campaign –as opposed to land invasion—that would 
turn Lebanon into “a country with no water, no 
electricity, no fuel” (Azoulay 2007). Although the 
security cabinet apparently rejected his plan, after 
the invasion, Amnesty International published a 
report accusing the State of Israel of war crimes for 
deliberately destroying Lebanon’s civilian infrastruc-
ture (Amnesty International 2006). Nevertheless 
Ramon was not alone in voicing this ‘new’ approach 
to deal with Gaza. For instances, Tzipi Livni, former 
Foreign Minister, backed his proposal and added that 
it is “inconceivable that life in Gaza continues to be 
normal” (Levy 2007: p.1). These declarations only 
added to increasing political pronouncements that 
unanimously supported repressive military actions 
targeting life itself. Dov Wiesglass, the person behind 
the disengagement, had already provided the way 
forward in what seemed to be an amusing security 
cabinet meeting immediately after Hamas had won 
elections. Israel’s policy, he said, would be “like an 
appointment with a dietician. The Palestinians will 
get a lot thinner, but won’t die.” (Levy 2006: p.1). 
These events uncovered a very troubling reality; that 
the Palestinian cannot be seen to be living without 
pain, that the spectacle, the “witnessing” effect in the 
moment of asphyxiating near death is in itself part 
of the life-source of the regime which demands the 
Palestinian collapse. As Bhungalia argues, “In Gaza, 
death is not ‘something to be hidden away’ but some-
thing to be strategically exposed. The spectacle of 
death is a critical reminder of the stakes involved in 
continued Hamas rule.” (Bhungalia 2008: p.355). 
Ramon’s infrastructure oxygen doctrine followed this 
logic, for infrastructure networks provided the biopo-
litical tool to regulate a diet of electricity, fuel, gas and 
water. Yet, as we shall see the ‘won’t die’ variable in 
this equation happened to be wrong. 
The full realization and sanction of the doctrine 
came in September 2007 with the plan commis-
sioned to Deputy Defence Minister Matan Vilani to 
limit essential services in Gaza. For Vilani the logic 
of the plan was as follows: “because this is an entity 
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that is hostile to us there is not reason for us to supply 
them with electricity beyond the minimum required to 
prevent a crisis” (Greenberg 2007) (emphasis added). 
The plan established that the supply of electricity and 
fuel would be reduced to a minimum that preserves 
the ‘humanitarian needs’. This shift towards the more 
benevolent realm of the humanitarian functioned as a 
way to cover an unlawful politically driven decision, 
and to redirect national security discourses away from 
military based approaches (see Berman 2005). The 
‘humanitarian minimum’, decided according to State 
and military calculations, reflects, as Darryl Li argues, 
how this notion “reduces the needs, aspirations, and 
rights of 1.4 million human beings to an exercise in 
counting calories, megawatts, and other abstract, one-
dimensional units that measure distance from death.” 
(Li 2008: p2). The plan managed to reduce the Gaza 
population to a condition of living death –as oppose 
to politically qualified individuals with rights— 
dependent on Israel’s will to let them live or die in 
function of their tolerance and not of any right to life. 
Whether occupied or hostile territory, and independ-
ently of the continuous qassam rocket barrages, the 
State of Israel had decisively adopted an open policy 
to target infrastructural networks –and thus the 
population as a whole—that allegedly constituted war 
crimes, collective punishment and sanctions against 
the Palestinian population (Gisha 2008). Yet when 
Defence Minister Ehud Barak gave green light to the 
plan in October, an article published by the English 
version of Yedioth Ahronoth –Israel’s most-read news-
paper—argued that: “the decision was not part of 
punishment measures, but rather an implementation 
of Israel’s gradual disengagement from Gaza following 
Hamas’ takeover of the Strip.”(Greenberg 2007). The 
talkback comments at the bottom of the article are 
indicative of the reader’s mood: “cut it all off”, “Barak 
what a sissy your are”, “turn off the power in the West 
Bank as well” or “Turning Off Power Helps Slow 
Global Warming”. 
The Thousand Deaths of Gaza
Cuts in electricity and fuel, although not offi-
cially, started immediately after the destruction of 
Gaza’s power plant. Already in July 2006, Gisha, 
the Israeli legal centre for freedom of movement, had 
issued various statements directed to the Defence 
minister calling to restrain from further damaging the 
resources critical for normal life, as well as to restore 
the interrupted supply of fuel and necessary equip-
ment to continue the provision of electricity. In the 
aftermath of operation Summer Rains (2005) OCHA 
reported that Gaza households were receiving six to 
eight hours of electricity per day, while most facilities 
in the urban areas were getting two to three hours 
of running water (OCHA 2006). Several organiza-
tions –Adalah, Gisha, Palestinian Center for Human 
Rights, Al-Haq or B’tselem but to name a few— were 
crucial in raising visibility to the severe consequences 
of bringing forward a policy that targeted Gaza’s 
fabric of life. What was described as a critical socio-
economic and public health situation only worsened 
in the following years as a result of Israel’s policy to 
maintain systematic electrical interruptions, power 
stoppages, fuel cuts, and a strict closure impeding the 
entrance of spare parts to repair network damages, let 
alone other ‘non-essential humanitarian needs’ such 
as medicine or food (Aid Agency of the Australian 
Council of Trade Unions 2008). 
The ‘infrastructural oxygen’ doctrine worked as 
a chain reaction that immediately spread across the 
Gaza strip shaking every dimension of everyday life. 
Directly or indirectly every inhabitant of the strip was 
affected. Modern life as we know it was forced to a 
halt. Electricity disruption impacted on home elec-
tric devices such as refrigerators, making impossible 
to preserve food, or elevators that stopped running in 
the multi-storied buildings that sustain Gaza’s urban 
density. Many family businesses such as bakeries or 
sewing ateliers had to close. Without electricity, water 
could not be extracted from the wells and then put 
into the distribution system to be later pumped into 
houses or industries. Neither could dirty waters from 
houses be transferred to sewage treatment plants. In 
addition, health services were severely affected by 
the impossibility to obtain regular power supply to 
run lifesaving equipment, generate oxygen, practice 
surgery operations, treat dialysis patients, or maintain 
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a minimal level of sanitation to avoid epidemics. The 
only option left to replace electric supply were fuel 
run generators, only in possession of some institutions 
and to those who could afford it. Nevertheless genera-
tors constantly failed after prolonged periods of time, 
and sanctions made it extremely difficult and expen-
sive to obtain the necessary fuel to use these devices 
as a reliable alternative source. A businessman from 
Gaza captured the severity of the crisis during the 
summer of 2006: “We have been thrown back to the 
way people lived 100 years ago, with no electricity. We 
do not have water, we don’t have milk for our kids” 
(Gisha 2006: p.1)” 
The results of the infrastructural oxygen doctrine 
designed in the offices of the Israeli Ministry of 
Justice, were but a calculated application of complex 
military doctrine underpinning contemporary infra-
structural warfare. As Graham (2005) explains, these 
attacks are systematic de-modernization efforts that 
target not only military forces but their civil socie-
ties as well. Targeting the electricity power plant and 
disrupting fuel distribution is considered in military 
terms as an ‘effect-based-operation’ (EBO). Israel 
knew too well that the consequences of this attack 
would have immediate and spiral effects aiming to 
induce complete societal chaos. 
The flow of electricity and fuel was at this stage 
relentlessly reduced to achieve the proposed aim of a 
‘humanitarian minimum’. The petition to the Israeli 
Supreme Court made by several human rights organi-
zations, in cooperation with the deputy director of 
the Coastal Municipalities Water Utility and a farmer 
from Beit Hanoun, did not impede the State of Israel 
to continue the allegedly illegal collective punishment 
while the hearings were still going on (Gisha 2008). 
After several months the petition was finally rejected 
by Israel’s Supreme Court, despite the documented 
evidence of harm to civilians caused by fuel and elec-
tricity cuts. As the Director of the legal center for 
Arab minority rights in Israel (Adalah) Hassan Jabari 
argued: “according to the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion, it is permitted to harm Palestinian civilians and 
create a humanitarian crisis for political reasons. This 
constitutes a war crime under international criminal 
law.” (Gisha 2008b: p.2). On the evening of January 
20 2008, few months after partial service had been 
restored, Gaza’s power plant ceased production. From 
this moment on the plant ceased production several 
times and the flow of electricity becomes continuously 
discontinued only reinforcing a situation of perma-
nent collapse (see Figure 2)
The ‘humanitarian implosion’ affecting Gaza was 
reflected in two reports published in 2008 by several 
recognized international organizations (OXFAM 
2008; OCHA 2008). The documents provide substan-
tial evidence of the public health catastrophe lived in 
the Gaza strip: three quarters of Gaza’s population 
are dependent on food aid, unemployment is close to 
half the total population, only 23 out of 3,900 indus-
trial enterprises are currently operational, schools 
had cancelled classes high on energy consumption, 
hospitals experience power cuts lasting for 8-12 hours, 
almost 30% of the population does not receive running 
water, 80% of the drinking water supplied does not 
meet WHO standards, 70% of agricultural land in 
Gaza are no longer being irrigated, and 70 millions 
liters of sewage goes into the sea due the lack of fuel 
to pump or treat human waste resulting in significant 
environmental damage. Although these figures reveal 
the accumulation of years of siege and blockade, 
most of them are directly or indirectly a result of the 
destruction of infrastructure and the manipulation, 
cuts and restrictions on essential services.
Life in Gaza was suspended and readjusted to 
an unpredictable schedule entirely dependent on 
electricity and fuel supply. The power to impose the 
everyday rhythms of life was exercised by Israel’s 
easy-trigger finger over the ‘on-off’ switch button: a 
deliberate attack on public health aiming at the very 
fabric of life. The years following the destruction of 
the power plant exposed an elastic ‘humanitarian 
crisis’, suspended in time, and continuously ‘on verge 
of collapse’ or ‘on the brink of disaster’ (see Figure 3). 
As Karen Koning Abu Zayd, the head of UNRWA 
warned, “Gaza is on the threshold of becoming the 
first territory to be intentionally reduced to a state of 
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abject destitution, with the knowledge, acquiescence 
and – some would say – encouragement of the inter-
national community.” (McGirk 2008: p.374). Yet, the 
real collapse of Gaza started with its occupation in 
1967 (or even before) and has since then being intensi-
fied and postponed. As Patrick Wolfe notes, “settler 
colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not 
an event” (Wolfe 2006: p.388). Post-disengagement 
Gaza only provided a new contained spatial scenario 
for a critical patient: an intensive care unit exposed to 
the world as a ‘big brother’ television show where the 
tension lies on observing a patient’ struggle between 
death and life every time ‘infrastructural oxygen’ 
tubes are turned off and back on.
Fuel for Thought
In deconstructing a particular historical event 
and its subsequent unfolding dynamics this paper has 
tried to highlight the ways in which colonial violence, 
in its discursive and material dimensions, is inscribed 
in physical space as well as in everyday life. By looking 
at infrastructural networks, the mediating mecha-
nisms that support everyday life, this paper has shown 
how Israeli policies of collective punishment remain 
enabled in post-disengagement Gaza. We have argued 
how a violent production of space involves discursive 
reworkings and imaginative geographies, as well as 
reassembling relations of subjugation. Infrastructural 
networks, usually taken for granted and neglected, 
become geopolitical sites and biopolitical tools where 
relations of power at a distance reach into the tiniest 
details of daily life through the rearrangements of 
basic service provision. In addition, the paper has 
exposed how the manipulation and systematic discon-
nection of these essential and critical systems has vast 
public health consequences. This is particularly so if 
we consider the long term consequences of targeting 
and manipulating infrastructural networks as oppose 
to immediate effects of military attacks. The paper 
stresses the critical role that infrastructure networks 
have in manufacturing collapse in Gaza, nevertheless 
Figure 3. Tranfer of industrial diesel from Israel to the Gaza Strip. November 2008 – January 
2009 (source: Gisha)
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we need to be careful not to over-generalize or exag-
gerate about the role of these systems in compounding 
for the overall crisis. They have played a crucial role in 
combination with many other factors such as inces-
sant military operations and an outright closure of 
goods and movement. 
The exposure of the ways in which violence is exer-
cised through infrastructure networks raises the need 
to “expand the range of referents of political violence 
beyond the anthropocentric horizon to include the 
material fabric of urban life” (Coward 2006: p.419). 
Yet to only focus on the physical damage and disrup-
tions to electrical, fuel, water and sewage networks 
would miss the point. Thus, as Muna Giacaman has 
argued, it is important to emphasize “the social and 
humanitarian elements that have significant impact 
on civilian health and life and future societal develop-
ment.” (Giacaman et al 2004: p.289). Accordingly, a 
full analysis of the infrastructure-violence nexus must 
be sought in a study of the systems that enable connec-
tion across wider configurations in time and space, it 
is here that we can map and eventually understand the 
power of more subtle spatializing practices that seek 
to enable strategies of domination. The concept of 
infrastructural violence provides a particularly useful 
lens through which to study the systematic politics of 
spatial reengineering that undoes the ordinary geog-
raphies of everyday life by generating and unfolding 
a hostile topography of infrastructure networks for 
purposes of population management and repression as 
well as territorial segregation and control. That is, the 
violent abuse and misuse of the interconnected set of 
socio-technical systems that sustain modern societies.
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